








Ottawa could move now to make good retirement savings plans accessible 
to more Canadians, and liberalize the rules governing retirement income.
NO. 126, FEBRUARY 2010
THE PENSION PAPERS/FINANCIAL SERVICESThe recent galvanization of debate over pensions in Canada has created a valuable
opportunity for reform. To capitalize on that opportunity, Canadians need to get past two
obstacles: a misplaced emphasis on classic defined-benefit (DB) plans and individual
schemes, such as defined-contribution (DC) plans and registered retirement saving plans
(RRSPs), as essentially the only options for “third-pillar” retirement saving; and paralyzing
complexities attending a root-and-branch revamp.
In its 2010 budget, the federal government can take some straightforward steps to break the
DB-DC/RRSP mental deadlock, improve the unhappy circumstances of many DC plan
participants and RRSP savers, and clear the field for larger, better third-pillar pensions.
Among them:
￿ Providing more tax deferral room for DC/RRSP savers. Using the federal Public Service
Plan as a benchmark suggests raising the contribution limit from 18 percent to 34
percent of earned income, and raising the maximum dollar amount proportionally,
from $22,000 to $42,000.
￿ Raising the age at which people lose access to tax-deferred saving and must start
decumulating from 71 to 73. 
￿ Making the pension credit available to people receiving income from a Registered
Retirement Income Fund (RRIF) or Life Income Fund (LIF) regardless of age, as it is to
recipients of annuities from pension plans. 
￿ Giving RRIF/LIF holders the same spousal income-splitting opportunities as recipients
of annuities from pension plans.  
￿ Alleviating the tax disadvantages of group RRSPs by letting sponsors and/or
participants deduct some administrative expenses currently levied against plan assets
from outside income, and by removing payroll levies from employer contributions.
Further changes to the Income Tax Actwould (i) make retirement-related services more readily
available to employees of small organizations and to the self-employed, and (ii) allow 
LIF-style payments from inside DC plans. Such changes would give more Canadians access
to cost-effective risk pooling and funds management, and foster a more robust third-pillar
retirement saving system. 
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P
ensions, once considered dull, are now
hot. After years of stress – evident in
the complex regulation and litigation
affecting pension plans and the erosion of
defined-benefit (DB) plans in the private
sector – the financial crisis has galvanized
debate about reform. Canadians have an
opportunity to harness that energy in aid of 
a constructive reworking of Canada’s “third-
pillar” pensions.
1
Such reform, however, requires pushing past the
mistaken view that classic DB plans and individual
schemes such as registered retirement saving plans
(RRSPs) are essentially the only options for the system.
The complexity of root-and-branch reforms also risks
deadlock or dissipation of effort.
Happily, near-term policy changes could move
the system in a promising direction. The 2010
federal budget could contain some straightforward
steps to promote more tax-deferred saving, make
good retirement saving plans accessible to more
Canadians, and liberalize the rules governing
retirement income – all no-regrets steps toward
larger, better third-pillar pensions.
Hung Up on a False Choice
One key source of stress on voluntary and occupational
retirement saving in Canada is an unhelpful
preoccupation with two familiar but flawed models:
traditional single-employer DB plans on the one hand,
and individual account plans such as defined-
contribution (DC) pension plans and RRSPs on the
other (Robson 2009).
The classic DB plan, which promises a given future
payment based on salary and years of service, appeared
to offer big guaranteed future annuities in return for
small deductions from current pay. But a key
assumption underlay this arrangement – that investing
in assets, such as equities, that did not match plan
liabilities offered higher returns that were increasingly
certain over time. As many employees in such industries
as steel, automobiles, and telecommunications
discovered to their cost, however, such an outcome is by
no means guaranteed.
2Fair-value reporting has revealed
the risks and higher costs of these arrangements, and
coverage by DB plans is eroding in the private sector.
3
Many people regret that development. They hold up
classic DB plans as an ideal, partly because the
alternative that usually comes to mind is the individual
account – at worst, the RRSP – in which, left to their
own devices, people risk saving the wrong amounts,
taking on too much risk or the wrong kinds of risk,
choosing the wrong accumulation and decumulation
vehicles, and ending up pinched in old age.
These drawbacks of individual plans are real. But
framing pension policy in terms of a false choice
between classic DB plans and DC/RRSPs has
stunted the development of fresh ideas. A scan of
recent official reviews, a federal discussion paper, and
pension-related initiatives reveals the extent to which
DB plans preoccupy policymakers.
4Their decline in
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This paper draws on remarks on the occasion of the C.D. Howe Institute Benefactors Lecture, 2009 (Ambachtsheer 2009). I thank attendees at
that Lecture, Steve Easson, Alex Laurin, and Ron Sanderson, members of the C.D. Howe Institute’s Financial Services Research Initiative and
the Pension Papers Advisory Group, and in particular Bob Baldwin, Ian Markham, James Pierlot, and Terri Troy, for comments. Responsibility
for the recommendations and any errors is mine alone.
1 I use “third pillar” to refer to the voluntary and contractual saving that builds retirement income above the levels provided by the safety net “first
pillar” – mainly Old Age Security and the Guaranteed Income Supplement – and the mandatory work-related “second pillar” – the Canada and
Quebec Pension Plans (CPP/QPP).
2 Laidler and Robson (2007) discuss the “equity premium” controversy, and show how far from guaranteed these higher assumed returns actually
were – a fact painfully highlighted by the market collapse in fall 2008.
3 Gougeon (2009) shows that, between 1991 and 2006, the number of private-sector employees in DB plans fell from 2.3 million (against total
private-sector employment of 8.8 million) to 2.0 million (against total private-sector employment of 11.8 million). In contrast, over the same
period, the number of public-sector employees in DB plans increased from 2.5 million to 2.6 million (against total public-sector employment of
2.9 and 3.3 million, respectively).
4 The mandate for Ontario’s review (Ontario 2008) was explicitly to promote DB plans. The Alberta-British Columbia Joint Expert Panel on
Pension Standards (JEPPS 2008) and Nova Scotia (2009) reviews are less tendentious, but they give DB-specific issues such as funding
requirements and surplus ownership much more attention than participation in these plans as a share of all Canadians saving for retirement
warrants. The federal discussion paper (Canada 2009b) devotes the bulk of its substantive discussion to DB plans, and the proposals arising from
those consultations (Canada 2009a) are likewise skewed toward DB concerns. Recent provincial initiatives responding to pension-related distress
(Ontario 2009, Quebec 2009) deal exclusively with DB issues.| 2 Backgrounder 126
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
the private sector is widely deplored, and their recent
troubles have prompted accommodations in funding
rules and some outright bailouts.
Policy toward DC/RRSPs is less supportive,
worsening their problems and inhibiting their
improvement.
5For one thing, savers in DC/RRSPs 
get less generous tax deferral than do most DB
participants. The Income Tax Act uses a “pension
adjustment” to estimate how much saving people
without DB plans need to do to accumulate the same
wealth as people with them. Because this adjustment
assumes relatively high returns and overlooks
important provisions often found in public-sector
plans, it tends to underestimate the required amounts
of saving. The result: annual contribution limits for
DC/RRSP savers are set relatively low.
6For similar
reasons, larger contributions for past service are possible
in DB plans than in DC/RRSPs. When, as notably
occurred recently, a DB plan’s assets fall short of its
liabilities, the act allows unlimited rebuilding, 
and regulators encourage it. In contrast, when assets in
DC plans or RRSPs fall short of expectations, annual
contribution limits make no accommodation.
Differences in the tax treatment of employer
contributions, as well as many costs, hinder saving in
DC/RRSPs more subtly. Employer contributions to
group RRSPs are subject to employment insurance
(EI) and CPP/QPP premiums, while employer
contributions to sponsored plans (whether DB or DC)
are not. RRSP savers also must absorb through their
accumulation period many administrative costs and
fees that are immediately deductible for sponsors
7–
and RRSP savers face higher fees to begin with, since,
unlike pension funds, the holders of their investments
are taxable businesses.
As for investment risk and costs, delegation of
investment management to experts, for better or worse,
is implicit in DB arrangements and explicit in pooled
DC plans. In individualized DC plans and group
RRSPs, however, sponsors have little ability to guide
participants’ asset choices. For costs, size matters – but
federal and provincial regulations inhibit pooled DC
plans that would offer economies of scale to employees
at small firms or the self-employed.
8
The contrast continues at retirement. The pension
credit that reduces income tax for people, regardless
of age, who receive income from a pension plan, is
available to people who receive income from a
Registered Retirement Income Fund or Life Income
Fund (RRIF or LIF) only after age 65. Similarly, the
minimum age at which the Income Tax Act permits
splitting of income from tax-deferred saving between
spouses is 65 for RRIF/LIF holders, but 55 for
pension plan members. Vitally important, DB
participants move smoothly to pensioner status, while
many DC and all RRSP savers face a potentially risky
and expensive transition to a separate annuity or
decumulation vehicle such as a RRIF or LIF. After
retirement, DB pensioners get unlimited tax-free
reinvestment of surplus funds, while outdated
formulas force RRIF and LIF holders to withdraw
faster than makes sense given today’s investment
returns and life expectancies (Robson 2008b). 
Overwhelmed by Complexity
Simply noting the policies that exacerbate the
disadvantages of DC/RRSPs relative to DB plans
highlights the fact that the apparent need to choose
between these two models is artificial. Change the
policies, and the range of options expands. Hybrid
plans – neither DB nor DC/RRSP, but with
attractive features of both – are possible and exist in
other countries. Contributors to the C.D. Howe
Institute Pension Papers series
9 and key passages in
several official reviews have outlined schemes to
5 Pierlot (2008) elaborates on many of these points.
6 The pension adjustment also creates inequities among DB plans. It takes no account, for example, of inflation-indexing of benefits, which public-
sector DB plans typically provide, but private-sector ones do not. It would be fairer if participants in DB plans without inflation protection and
DC/RRSP savers alike, got additional tax-deferred saving room that they could use to bolster their retirement incomes against erosion by inflation.
7 In a sense, RRSP holders eventually are compensated because the tax they pay on withdrawn funds does not apply to funds they paid in fees. Most
RRSP holders, however, likely would prefer a current deduction against their employment income.
8 Kyle (2009) cites proprietary data from Great-West Life Assurance that suggest all-in cost differences between large and small DC plans in Canada
(pooled and segregated funds, both actively and passively managed) are similar to those Deloitte (2009) finds in US 401K plans – that is, around
200 basis points per dollar of assets for small plans, around 80 basis points for medium plans, and around 60 basis points for large plans.
9 Laidler and Robson (2007), Ambachtsheer (2008, 2009) and Pierlot (2008) all explore this territory.Backgrounder 126 | 3
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promote and facilitate saving to achieve target
payouts, nudge participants into cost-effective
investments, and smooth the transition to user-
friendly decumulation vehicles. 
Going from outline to implementation, however,
is not straightforward. Some Canadians
undoubtedly should save more, but we know too
little about how much people of different ages,
income levels, and family situations actually do, or
should, save.
10 We worry about risk profiles, but a
heterogeneous population means we lack reliable
prescriptions for better ones or tools with which to
nudge people toward them. Key design features of
potential revamps are both unclear and
controversial; they span pooled plans run by
existing private-sector providers, through
government-mandated aggregator/payers, to
additions to the CPP/QPP (Horner 2009).
Notwithstanding early enthusiasm, most evident in
British Columbia’s commitment to a provincially
led, universally accessible plan,
11 a coherent root-
and-branch restructuring of Canada’s third-pillar
pensions is not an immediate prospect.
The Short List for the 2010 Federal Budget
The longer-term stresses exacerbated by the pension
crisis are real, and the federal government’s October
2009 proposals (Canada 2009a) signalled its
willingness to act. But of the six sets of proposals,
only one would relieve DC plans of some
obligations that make no sense outside a DB context
and allow LIF benefits to be paid from within DC
plans; the other five focus on DB plans and their
stresses, and RRSP savers got no attention at all.
With the 2010 budget, however, Ottawa has an
opportunity, mainly through changes to the Income
Tax Act, to break the DB-DC/RRSP deadlock and
move several important steps toward a richer, 
more robust system.
The first step is to provide more tax deferral
room for DC/RRSP savers. Using the federal
Public Service Plan as a benchmark suggests
changes to two numbers: raising the current
maximum percentage of earned income from 
18 percent to 34 percent, and making a propor-
tional change in the maximum dollar amount,
from $22,000 to $42,000 (Laurin and Robson
2009, 3). Fiscal pressures might appear to make 
it hard to sell a one-year jump to these higher
numbers. Yet among the October 2009 proposals
was one to increase the maximum permitted
overfunding of DB plans from 10 percent to 25
percent of liabilities. This would be an important
improvement in the environment for these plans,
12
but it would have little impact on tax revenue in
the short run because most DB plans currently have
sizeable deficiencies. The number of DC/RRSP
savers able to use an increase in contribution room
would be limited at first – suggesting the need for a
phased increase – but in the long run more
generous limits would make for a fairer and better
funded retirement-income system.
Although significant help for DC/RRSP savers to
recover from setbacks would require a lifetime
pension saving limit – as Pierlot (2008) suggests –
two immediate steps would aid many. First, the age
at which people lose access to tax-deferred saving
and must start decumulating should rise from 71 to,
say, 73. Second, once the holder is drawing income,
the pension credit should apply regardless of age,
and RRSP holders should have the same spousal
income-splitting opportunities as registered plan
members. Less salient, but still quickly achievable
would be to alleviate the tax disadvantages of group
RRSPs by letting sponsors and/or participants
deduct some administrative expenses currently
levied against plan assets from outside income, and
by removing federal payroll taxes from employer
contributions.
10 Baker and Milligan (2009) discuss the heterogeneity of incomes replaced in retirement, gaps in measures of income, and the difficulties relating
incomes to consumption and economic wellbeing. Dodge et al. (forthcoming) highlight the differences in saving efforts required at different
income levels and different points in life to hit a given replacement target.
11 The B.C. government has followed up its commitment in the last provincial election to a new plan with legislation to facilitate pooling, but no
further concrete plans have emerged.
12 Banerjee and Robson (2008) advocated it to remove a bias toward underfunding plans.| 4 Backgrounder 126
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But facilitating the growth of DC plans to scales
that would give more Canadians access to cost-
effective, expert funds management needs changes
of a different sort to the Income Tax Act. Currently,
to establish a multi-employer pension plan, a
potentially disparate group of employers must come
together and create a trusteed organization.
Allowing third parties, such as financial institutions
or purpose-built cooperatives, to administer such a
plan would make retirement-related services more
readily available to employees of small organizations
and to the self-employed. A complementary change
to the act could allow DC plans to cover the same
types of income that create RRSP contribution
room – among other things, such a change would
give the self-employed access to third-party-
administered plans. Also, changing the current
requirement of an employer-employee relationship
would create new opportunities for existing
financial institutions or specialized providers to
enrol employees of small businesses and the self-
employed.
As noted already, the recent federal proposals
envision allowing LIF-style payments from inside
DC plans, instead of forcing participants to transfer
outside them, as is now the case. The 2010 budget
should implement this proposal. Indeed, it could
go further. Since 1992, the Income Tax Act has
forbidden DC plans to practise “self-annuitization”
– that is, to offer guaranteed payments without
maintaining a separate fund, so that participants
again need not leave the plan or transfer to a
separate fund to get the payments.
13 At the time,
however, several plans that already offered such
annuities were grandfathered, which suggests that
examples do exist of appropriate safeguards against
unsupported promises. Unless the tight timeline
precludes drafting rules governing this type of
annuity from a DC plan, the 2010 budget should
permit them.
Turning to age-related restrictions on tax-
effective reinvestment, RRSP savers could also
benefit from relaxing the prohibitions against
buying annuities with terms that exceed age 90
with non-locked-in funds and against buying term
annuities of any kind with locked-in funds. As well,
although the 2009 federal budget’s one-year 25
percent reduction in mandatory withdrawals from
RRIFs and LIFs acknowledged that the rules can
force people to deplete their assets too quickly, this
temporary fix was far from adequate. Far better
would be simply to abolish these rules. If such a
change appears too radical, changing a handful 
of numbers to adjust the current formula, which
dates from 1992, to take account of longer life
expectancies and lower recent investment returns 
is imperative (Robson 2008b).
Beyond 2010
These are the first steps: realizing the promise of
richer, more accessible and more secure pensions for
Canadians requires much more. When it comes to
saving, a lifetime limit makes sense. An alternative
would be lifetime averaging, in which savers carry
earned income above the annual contribution limit
forward or backward to create additional room in
years when income is below the limit (Mintz and
Wilson 2002). Pending tax reform on that front,
unused contribution room could be indexed to
inflation and DC members permitted past service
contributions up to their unused RRSP
contribution room.
14 A reform that would
complement broadening the categories of income
eligible for pension-plan coverage would be
amending the Income Tax Act’s “primary purpose”
provisions to allow coverage to continue post-
employment, so that leaving an employer did not
automatically end participation in a plan.
13 The rationale for the prohibition appears to be simply that annuities were a defined benefit (Pierlot 2008) – a nice illustration of how the false
dilemma has hampered the development of hybrid plans.
14 To protect plan administrators from liability in the event of an overcontribution, the member would have to be uniquely responsible for any tax
penalty incurred.Turning to nudging, “good faith” or “safe
harbour” provisions would help sponsors, including
employers that support group RRSPs, to encourage
people to save more, invest sensibly, and decumulate
safely. Liberalized rules about who can sponsor and
participate in plans and how plans pay benefits –
including more flexible arrangements for
annuitization in DC plans – would create new
opportunities for pooled plans run by private
providers that would fill the rich space between
classic DB plans and DC/RRSPs. 
These last proposals require federal and
provincial action on several fronts – indeed, they
are part of the larger, and more complex, debate
about fundamental third-pillar reform. That debate
is important – but in the meantime, Canadians
need to move past the false choice and avoid getting
blocked by complexity. Early action can improve
the retirement prospects of Canadians in defined-
contribution pension plans and RRSPs and
promote the evolution of a richer pension system.
At the federal level, the right place to start is the
2010 budget.
C.D. Howe Institute
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